The transcript, click to view transcript, of the following April 22, 2013 hearing:
Filing Date
|
Document Type
|
Filed By
|
Description
|
|---|---|---|---|
While the subject was supposed to be the "Security, Preparedness and Terrorism", interestingly several points were made regarding the scheduling of A1201003 (San Jose Water Company General Rate Case), as well as testimony by SJWC employees regarding "Security, Preparedness and Terrorism".
SJWC Rate Increase Schedule, A.12-01-003
The transcript indicates that the SJWC and DRA were still negotiating, issues in the General Rate Increase, as of April 22, 2013. The ALJ wanted no more than 30 days before the ALJ finding being prepared and submitted to the CPUC Commissioner and subsequently CPUC for a ruling. April 22 plus 30 days is roughly May 24, it can be anticipated that the ALJ and the Commissioner will need 7-14 days and then it would be referred to the CPUC for a ruling, anticipated another 7-14 days. We should anticipate a ruling on the GRC ( A.12-01-003) between June 14 and June 28, 2013. as of June 1, 2013 the CPUC website does not indicate any further information.
Security, Preparedness and Terrorism
The SJWC Pre-Hearing Report dated February 15, 2013 with no substantial changes became Document No. SJW 20:
Report of San Jose Water Company Addressing Security Requirements, Practices and Procedures, dated February 27, (Exhibit No. SJW-20 was marked for identification.)
This report provides the history and status in general terms SJWC security practices, facility security and computer including the SCADA control system.
The water processing facility security issues were addressed in the following testimony:
(excerpt from page 414 of the transcript)
"The Montevina treatment plant is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The Saratoga water treatment plant is staffed part time, but the operating system, control system, is ported in electronically into the Montevina console. So the operator who is at the console at Montevina is also monitoring Saratoga.That plant is set up such that if any water quality parameter falls out of a pre-set range it shuts the plant off automatically."
The SCADA "console" (in most cases a PC with several displays) referenced in the testimony, used by SJWC allows remote monitoring and control of a remote facility. The physical facility intrusion generally consists of sensors on gates, doors and fences. Apparently many of the facilities also have surveillance TV cameras. The testimony doesn't specifically address the TV cameras, but in many cases rusted signs on the fences indicate cameras are used.
(excerpt from page 414 of the transcript)
"The Montevina treatment plant is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The Saratoga water treatment plant is staffed part time, but the operating system, control system, is ported in electronically into the Montevina console. So the operator who is at the console at Montevina is also monitoring Saratoga.That plant is set up such that if any water quality parameter falls out of a pre-set range it shuts the plant off automatically."
The SCADA "console" (in most cases a PC with several displays) referenced in the testimony, used by SJWC allows remote monitoring and control of a remote facility. The physical facility intrusion generally consists of sensors on gates, doors and fences. Apparently many of the facilities also have surveillance TV cameras. The testimony doesn't specifically address the TV cameras, but in many cases rusted signs on the fences indicate cameras are used.
Q With regards to the treated water vessels, do you have realtime monitoring of those?
A We have realtime intrusion alarms, sort of several layers. Kind of one at the front gate. There is a perimeter fence around any of the reservoirs that sort of is an interior perimeter fence that has a system of alarming built into the fence itself. Then any of the hatch openings are also alarmed. All that is monitored realtime.
It appears many facility gates sensors only detect a wide open gate. Although it appears the testimony may be incomplete, as shown in the following picture. There is a stop but apparently no sensor?:
A We have realtime intrusion alarms, sort of several layers. Kind of one at the front gate. There is a perimeter fence around any of the reservoirs that sort of is an interior perimeter fence that has a system of alarming built into the fence itself. Then any of the hatch openings are also alarmed. All that is monitored realtime.
It appears many facility gates sensors only detect a wide open gate. Although it appears the testimony may be incomplete, as shown in the following picture. There is a stop but apparently no sensor?:
Most of the information was contained in other documents from SJWC and DRA that haven't been released and are not presently available to the public.
No comments:
Post a Comment